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ABSTRACT 
In the present study we investigate the effects of leverage and growth opportunities on the extent of 
hedging under financial distress. Contrary to the theories, the results indicate that hedging and leverage decisions are 
not endogenous. We also found that when the level of financial distress is low, the incremental tax benefits of debt 
and growth opportunities might not be significant enough to motivate hedging. When the level of financial distress 
is high, hotel reduce the overall extent of hedging as leverage and growth opportunities increase. Finally, hotel firms’ 
high level of financial distress might contribute to the negative relationship between management ownership and 
hedging. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Hotels are sensitive to interest rate risk because of their high leverage and cyclical business. Hotels have high 
leverage because they are capital intensive, resulting in a huge need of external financing, which is usually 
collateralized by fixed assets (Dalbor & Upneja, 2004). For example, during the 2002-2004 period, hotel firms had a 
long-term debt ratio of 47% and a short-term debt ratio of 12% (Jang, Tang, & Chen, 2008), while the average ratio 
of the long-term debt to the total assets for non-financial firms in the U.S. is only 23%, and 7.4% for the short-term 
debt ratio in 1991 (Rajan & Zingales, 1995). With higher financial leverage, hotels naturally are burdened with 
higher debt service obligations and thus more exposure to interest rate risk, especially when a large portion of 
outstanding debt consists of floating-rate debt. 
 
The hotel business is also highly sensitive to changes in the economic environment (Choi, Olsen, Kwansa, & 
Tse, 1999). Specifically, Corgel and Gibson (2005) showed a strong and positive correlation between RevPAR and 
London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR) changes. The researchers argued that when the economy is strong, the 
demand for money increases, which, in turn results in a higher interest rate. At the same time, increasing leisure and 
business travel would also increase hotel cash flows. The strong correlation between cash flows and the interest rate 
would result in higher exposure to interest rate risk.  
 
To manage the exposure to interest rate risk, hotels can either employ financial hedging or adjust the leverage. 
The difference lies in that financial hedging mitigates the outcomes of risk exposure while leverage adjustment 
directly controls the exposure itself. Nevertheless, leverage and hedging decisions are interrelated and endogenous 
because of their opposite effect on financial distress (Smith & Stulz, 1985). This endogeneity between hedging and 
leverage has to be considered while examining the hedging decisions of hotels.  
 
Purnanandam (2008) showed that the relationship between financial distress and the extent of hedging is 
concave. This suggests that the effect of hedging incentives could be contingent on the level of financial distress. 
Therefore, the purpose of this study is to examine the effects of hedging determinants that are closely related to 
financial distress under different levels of financial distress in the context of interest rate risk.  
 
HEDGING AND FINANCIAL LEVERAGE 
High leverage would lead to high probability of financial distress, which gives companies motivations to 
hedge. With hedging, the firm could lower its financial distress, which in turn allows the firm to increase its leverage 
in order to maximize the tax benefits of debt (Smith & Stulz, 1985). This two-stage circular causality suggests that 1
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 hedging and leverage are endogenous and positively related. Graham and Rogers’ (2002) empirical study also 
supported this positive bi-directional relationship. Leland (1998) further argued that shareholders may still 
voluntarily agree to hedge ex post when the potential tax benefit of higher leverage allowed by risk reduction is 
greater than the value of the agency cost of debt. Ross (1996) also argued that the tax benefit of increased leverage 
could be one of the strongest benefits for corporate hedging. 
 
Based on Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) argument, the relationship between hedging and financial leverage, 
however, could be negative. They argued that shareholders could extract value from creditors by increasing the 
volatility of firm value in hoping for higher probability of the “upper-tail” outcomes. In the meantime, creditors’ 
investment risk is also increased but the returns are still fixed. In other words, increasing firm value volatility (i.e. 
not hedging) would transfer value from creditors to shareholders. This value transfer due to “risk-shifting” is 
referred to as the agency cost of debt (Leland, 1998). 
 
We propose that the discrepancy between Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Leland’s (1998) predictions on 
hedging behavior could be partially explained by taking into account the level of financial distress. In lower level of 
financial distress, when a healthy firm increases its leverage, the level of financial distress does not necessary follow 
the steps, but the firm can still take advantage of the tax benefits of debt. This is the scenario predicted by Leland’s 
(1976; 1998) theoretical model and supported by Graham and Rogers’ (2002) empirical findings.  
 
For firms with high level of financial distress, the increase of leverage would dramatically increase the 
probability of default. Under such situation, shareholders would have stronger incentives increase the volatility of 
firm value. In other words, at high level of financial distress, the value associated with the call option of equity 
dominates the expected bankruptcy cost borne by shareholders. Shareholders will lose incentive to hedge in order to 
increase the expected value of equity (Stulz, 1996). This concave relationship is supported by Purnanandam’s (2008) 
theoretical model. Therefore, we hypothesize and test whether the relationship between hedging and leverage is 
contingent on the level of financial distress: a positive relationship in low financial distress and a negative 
relationship in high financial distress. 
 
H1: Hedging and leverage decisions are endogenous. 
H2: Hedging and leverage decisions are positively related in low and moderate financial distress but negatively 
related in high financial distress. 
 
HEDGING AND GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES 
Myers (1977) stated that issuing risky debt creates incentives for the firm’s shareholders to underinvest 
because the benefits from new investments are shared with creditors. Underinvestment incurs costs in the form of 
lost growth opportunities from positive NPV projects. Bessembinder (1991) argued that hedging can mitigate the 
underinvestment problem because hedging reduces the probability of default, thus creditors’ sensitivity to 
investment risk. This allows equity holders to capture a larger portion of the benefits from new investments. Since 
underinvestment costs are most severe for firms with attractive investment opportunities (Graham & Rogers, 2002) 
and hedging can mitigate the underinvestment problem, the relationship between hedging and growth opportunities 
should be positive. This relationship is especially strong when external finance is costly because hedging ensures 
sufficient internal funds for undertaking attractive investment opportunities (Froot, Scharfstein, & Stein, 1993). 
However, empirical evidence has been inclusive. While Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993), Gay and Nam (1998), 
and Singh and Upneja (2007) found a positive relationship between hedging and growth opportunities, Mian (1996), 
Geczy, Minton, and Schrand   (1997), and Allayannis and Ofek (2001) found no relationship between hedging and 
growth opportunities. Graham and Rogers (2002) further showed that the direction of this relationship depends on 
the choice of proxies for growth opportunities: a negative relationship for research and development (R&D) 
expenses and a positive relationship for market-to-book ratio. 
 
The conflict between theories and empirical evidence may be explained by reconsidering the application 
Bessembinder’s (1991) theory under high financial distress. Consider the case of high financial distress when 
creditors’ claim is larger than firm value including new investments. Even if hedging can effectively reduce 
creditor’s sensitivity to investment risk, shareholders’ share of the investment benefits is still zero because creditors 
have a senior claim to all value of the firm. The logical response of shareholders would be reducing hedging in order 
to increase the expected value of equity (Stulz, 1996). Also, for firms under a high level of financial distress, 
external finance might not be available. In such case, growth opportunities should provide an even stronger 2
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 incentive for financially distressed firms to hedge (Froot, et al., 1993). Therefore, when the level of financial distress 
is high, growth opportunities and hedging would be negatively correlated. 
 
H3: Hedging and growth opportunities are positively related in low financial distress but negatively related in high 
financial distress. 
 
MODEL SPECIFICATION 
Two-Step Hedging Decision 
Many studies (Gay & Nam, 1998; Graham & Rogers, 2002; D. G. Haushalter, 2000) have used the Tobit 
model to estimate the extent of hedging because it appears to be left censored. However, Maddala (2001) argued that 
the Tobit model is applicable only in cases where the latent variable can take negative values and the observed zero 
values are due to nonobservability. In the case of the extent of hedging, the value will not be negative and the zero 
observations are not due to nonobservability, but are the result of managers’ decisions not to hedge. For such a 
situation, Maddala (2001) argued that one has to model the decision that produces the zero observations rather than 
use the Tobit model mechanically. Singh and Upneja (2007) also discussed the importance of using a two-step 
approach to separate the decision on whether to hedge from the decision on the extent of hedging. Therefore, we 
adopt a two-step procedure (Heckman, 1979) to address the sample selection bias on the estimation of the extent of 
hedging caused by the decision to hedge. In the first step of Heckman’s procedure, the decision to hedge is estimated 
by a probit regression (eq. 1). Based on the predicted value of this estimation, the Mill’s ratio is obtained by 
calculating the ratio of the value of the standard normal density function to the value of the standard normal 
cumulative distribution function. In the second step, this Mill’s ratio is added to the extent-of-hedging equation to 
correct the sample selection bias caused by the decision to hedge (eq. 2). The model is specified as follows. The 
definitions and discussions of the variables adopted are listed in Table 1 and the paragraphs below.  
 
FDGWFDLEVFDGWLEVExtent ×+×++++= 543210 ββββββ  
2109876 εγλβββββ +++++++ SIZEMGTINFONOLFLOAT  
Eq. 2 
 
Table 1. Variable Definitions of the Hedging Equations 
Variable Definition 
Hedger 1 = hedger; 0 = non-hedger 
Extent nominal value / total assets 
LEV long-term debt / total assets  
GW market value of equity / book value of common equity  
FD 1 if Z-score < 0.2087; 0 otherwise 
INTCOVER EBIT / interest expense  
CASH cash and equivalents/total assets  
FLOAT floating-rate debt/total debt  
INFO common shares outstanding / common shareholders  
MGT options outstanding/common shares outstanding  
SIZE ln(total assets) 
 
Current risk management theories do not distinguish the determinants of the decision to hedge from those of 
the extent of hedging. Therefore, the extent of hedging is based on the same hedging incentives except cash holdings, 
which is substituted by the ratio of floating-rate. The rationale is that cash is considered as an alternative to hedging 
(Haushalter, Klasa, & Maxwell, 2007). Once the firm decides to hedge interest rate risk, the extent of hedging would 
be more directly influenced by the amount of floating-rate debt than cash holdings. The product of leverage and 
financial distress and the product of growth opportunities and financial distress are included in the extent of hedging 
equation to test hypotheses 2 and 3.  
 
One important variable in this study is the level of financial distress. Many studies have used leverage as a 
proxy for the level of financial distress (see Triki (2005)) by assuming that firms with higher leverage face higher 
probabilities of encountering financial distress. However, the level of leverage incorporates more information than 
NOLGWLEVHedger 3210 αααα +++= MGTINFO 54 αα ++
176 εαα +++ CASHSIZE  
Eq.1 
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 just financial distress, namely the tax benefits of debt. Also, leverage is more of a management decision while 
financial distress reflects the status of a firm’s financial health given the management decision and external 
environment at the time. Therefore, to clearly examine the relationship between hedging activity and its 
determinants under different levels of financial distress, the measurement of leverage and financial distress must be 
separated. The separation also enables us to determine if hedging response to the tax benefit of debt or the reduction 
of financial distress. 
 
We used Altman’s Z-score (Altman, 1968) to construct a financial distress dummy variable (FD). A large Z-
score value indicates a low level of financial distress. Using a sample of manufacturing firms, Altman (1968) 
identified a Z-score value of 2.675 to separate the bankrupt and the non-bankrupt firms. However, in this hotel 
sample, the Z-score ranges from -0.546 to 1.078, meaning all hotels should be classified as bankrupt firms under 
Altman’s definition. Therefore, the 25% quartile Z-score (0.2087) is used as the cutoff point of classifying 
financially distressed hotels. The binary variable, FD, is assigned 1 when Z is smaller than 0.2087 and is assigned 0 
otherwise.  
 
Based on risk management studies (DeMarzo & Duffie, 1995; Geczy, et al., 1997; Nance, et al., 1993; Tufano, 
1996), we also include net operating loss carryforwards, information asymmetry, management incentive, firm size, 
cash holdings, and the ratio of floating-rate debt to total debt as control variables. 
 
Hedging and Leverage Endogeneity 
The Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test is used to test the endogeneity of hedging decision in leverage decision 
and vice versa. The DWH test compares the coefficients estimated by simultaneous equations to those estimated by 
OLS (Davidson & MacKinnon, 2004). To test the endogeneity, we follow Tang and Jang (2007) to model leverage 
as a function of fixed assets (PPE), growth opportunities (GW), earnings volatility (VOL), agency costs (FCF), 
profitability (ROA), and firm size (SIZE) shown in equation 3. The variable definitions are listed in Table 2. 
 
0γ=LEV 3654321 εγγγγγγ +++++++ SIZEROAFCFVOLGWPPE  Eq.3 
 
Table 2. Variable Definition of Leverage Equation 
Variable Definition 
PPE net PPE / total assets  
VOL moving standard deviation of 3-year EBIT  
FCF net cash flow/total assets  
ROA net income / total assets 
 
DATA 
The sample for the hotel industry is the publicly traded hotel firms and casino hotels as defined by North 
America Classification System codes 721110 and 721120 respectively. The financial data are downloaded from the 
COMPUSTAT database and the notional value and the direction of the position of the interest rate derivatives are 
collected from 10-K filings with the keywords, “derivative,” “interest rate,” “market risk,” “swap,” “long-term debt,” 
and “floating-rate.” Only firms with information on both COMPUSTAT and EDGAR are selected for the sample. 
After deleting outliers and missing data, 150 firm-year observations from 45 companies are obtained from the 2002 
to 2006 period. There are 73 firm-year observations from 19 hedging firms and 77 firm-year observations from 22 
non-hedging companies. 
 
Table 3. Average Holdings of Interest Rate Derivatives 
Derivative Type  Mean Median Std. Max. Min. 
Nominal Value (million): N      
 Floating-to-fixed rate swap 27 168.6 100.0 191.7 738.5 4.0 
 Interest rate cap 27 330.7 197.0 376.8 1607.0 35.0 
 Fixed-to-floating rate swap 46 327.9 300.0 254.0 1050.0 50.0 
Scaled by Total Assets: T      
 Floating-to-fixed rate swap 12 6.75% 7.19% 5.83% 22.49% 0.39% 
 Interest rate cap 9 17.15% 17.75% 9.67% 39.69% 2.26% 
 Fixed-to-floating rate swap 12 6.14% 4.52% 5.73% 29.10% 0.90% 4
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 Note: N: number of observations; T: number of companies holding the instrument 
 
Based on the effect on debt obligations, interest rate instruments are divided into long and short positions. 
Floating-to-fixed swaps and interest rate caps are categorized as long positions (LONG) and fixed-to-floating swaps 
are recorded as short positions (SHORT).  
 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Summary statistics are presented in Table 4.  
 
Table 4. Summary Statistics and T-tests 
N = 150     Mean (Std.) Max. P50 Min. 
Extent 0.062 (0.10) 0.597 0 0 
LEV 0.432 (0.51) 1.013 0.410 0 
GW 2.085 (7.45) 23.30 1.837 -71.45 
Z-score 0.340 (0.23) 1.078 0.345 -0.546 
INTCOVER 2.121 (3.52) 30.61 1.801 -9.505 
CASH 0.093 (0.11) 0.628 0.055 0.004 
FLOAT 0.334 (0.34) 1 0.236 0 
INFO 154.4(552) 5208 11.96 0.976 
MGT 0.089 (0.08) 0.430 0.082 0 
Total Assets 3160 (4608) 22284 1331 6.191 
PPE 0.638 (0.21) 0.957 0.681 0.072 
VOL 46.36 (74.2) 435.4 14.20 0.119 
FCF 0.005 (0.06) 0.317 0.002 -0.216 
ROA -0.01 (0.17) 0.179 0.022 -1.874 
Revenue 940 (1326) 6071 386 0 
Note: Total assets and revenues are in millions. 
 
As shown in Table 5, none of the DWH tests is significantly, which suggests that hotel managers are making 
hedging and leverage decisions separately, a departure from theories. Therefore, hypothesis 1 is not supported and 
the hedging decision will be estimated independent of leverage decision. This presents an opportunity to increase 
firm value considering some of the hedging benefits are related to financial leverage. 
 
Table 5. Durbin-Wu-Hausman Tests 
 All positions LONG SHORT 
Endogeneity of Hedging Extent in 
Leverage 0.12 (0.72) 0.35 (0.55) 2.97 (0.09) 
Endogeneity of Leverage in Hedging 
Extent 0.42 (0.52) 0.30 (0.59) 0.23 (0.63) 
Note: Figures reported are F-values. The p-values are in parenthesis. 
 
The results of the two-step hedging decision based on the Heckman model are reported in Panel A, Table 6. 
The analysis is repeated for long and short positions. All three measures of the hedging extent share the same first 
step equation (decision to hedge). The Mill’s ratio is not significant in all three measurements, indicating that the 
sample selection bias is not serious in this sample. In such case, OLS is a more efficient estimation method. But the 
adoption of the Heckman model is based on the logic that firms have to first decide whether to hedge and then 
decide how much to hedge. Since these two decisions could response differently to the same hedging incentives, we 
still estimate hedging decision with Heckman model to explore the possible different behaviors. The results of OLS 
estimation is presented in Panel B for comparison. 
 
The effects of leverage and growth opportunities on hedging are only significant when financial distress is 
incorporated, which signals the importance of financial distress on the effects of hedging determinants. Specifically, 
leverage and growth opportunities do not have significant impacts on the decision to hedge and the extent of 
hedging under a lower level of financial distress. It could be that at a lower level of financial distress, the 5
Tang and Jang: Interest rate hedging
Published by ScholarW rks@UMass Amherst, 2009
 incremental increase of potential financial distress costs from higher leverage and the cost of lost growth 
opportunities are not significant enough to motivate hedging. Under high financial distress, the effect of leverage is 
as hypothesized; the extent of hedging decreases as leverage increases. Therefore, hypothesis 2 is partially supported. 
 
Table 6. Analysis of Hedging Decisions 
Panel A: Two-step hedging decision estimated by Heckman model 
 Extent of hedging  Decision to hedge Y = All positions LONG  SHORT  
LEV -0.009 (-0.08) -0.058 (-0.95) 0.485 (0.84)  -0.746 (-1.08) 
GW -0.001 (-0.17) -0.002 (-0.39) 0.000 (0.09)  0.007 (0.33) 
FD 1.541 (4.39) 0.537 (2.68) 1.004 (5.53)   
LEV*FD -2.138 (-3.99) -0.704 (-2.29) -1.433 (-5.17)   
GW*FD -0.019 (-1.89) -0.007 (-1.15) -0.013 (-2.41)   
FLOAT 0.071 (1.32) 0.088 (2.95) -0.018 (-0.64)   
CASH     -2.616 (-1.24) 
NOL -0.031 (-0.55) 0.005 (0.17) -0.036 (-1.25)  0.511 (1.24) 
INFO -0.000 (-0.17) 0.000 (0.22) -0.000 (-0.55)  0.001 (1.16) 
MGT -0.379 (-1.40) -0.596 (-4.03) 0.217 (1.55)  -0.325 (-0.18) 
SIZE -0.058 (-1.49) -0.045 (-2.11) -0.013 (-0.65)  0.450 (5.51) 
CONST 0.665 (1.84) 0.514 (2.61) 0.150 (0.81)  -2.692 (-3.79) 
Mill’s λ -0.135 (-1.03) -0.065 (-0.91) -0.070 (-1.03)   
Wald χ2 94.31 166.90 82.24   
 
Panel B: One-step hedging decision estimated by OLS 
Y = All positions LONG  SHORT  
LEV 0.005 (0.08) 0.013 (0.27) -0.008 (-0.29)  
GW -0.007 (-1.52) -0.008 (-2.17) 0.001 (0.43)  
FD -0.006 (-0.11) -0.018 (-0.45) 0.013 (0.54)  
LEV*FD 0.010 (0.11) 0.012 (0.17) -0.002 (-0.05)  
GW*FD 0.006 (1.35) 0.007 (1.88) -0.001 (-0.30)  
FLOAT 0.124 (5.19) 0.104 (5.51) 0.020 (1.80)  
NOL 0.018 (0.71) 0.038 (1.98) -0.021 (-1.86)  
INFO 0.000 (1.54) 0.000 (2.73) -0.000 (-1.34)  
MGT -0.223 (-2.14) -0.226 (-2.73) 0.002 (0.05)  
SIZE 0.015 (3.18) 0.006 (1.57) 0.009 (4.23)  
LIQ -0.024 (-0.32) -0.028 (-0.47) 0.004 (0.11)  
CONST -0.050 (-1.24) -0.005 (-0.16) -0.045 (-2.42)  
Adj. R2 0.258 0.340 0.117  
F 5.68 7.92 2.78  
Note: Figures in parentheses are the z-value for Heckman model and the t-value for OLS. 
 
Under a high level of financial distress, growth opportunities have a significant negative effect on short 
positions, no effect on long positions, and a marginal negative effect on the overall positions. The discrepancy 
between the results of long and short positions might be explained by considering the purposes of hedging 
instruments. Short positions (fixed-to-floating swaps) are used to reduce the interest rate exposure of in-flows (i.e. 
revenue and notes receivable) while long positions are used to hedge the exposure of out-flows. When financially 
distressed hotels encounter positive growth opportunities, shareholders would have incentives to reduce short 
positions to increase the volatility of operating exposure (Corgel & Gibson, 2005) and notes receivables from 
timeshare business in hoping to finance the growth opportunities with upper-tail outcomes. In sum, hypothesis 3 is 
only partially supported. 
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 The financial distress dummy has a positive sign, which suggests that hotels hedge more under high level of 
financial distress. This appears to be a departure from Stulz’s (1996) prediction that shareholders would want to 
increase the volatility of firm value when the level of financial distress is high. However, as indicated by the 
coefficients, short positions are much more responsive to the financial distress dummy than long positions do. Since 
financially distressed hotels have significantly less profits and revenues, the additional short positions are less likely 
for hedging away the exposure of revenue and income to interest rate risk. Instead, this might be a hint that 
financially distressed hotels are using interest rate swaps to increase volatility, not hedging away risk. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this study, we uncovered four unique hedging behaviors in hotel firms. First, hotels do not consider hedging 
decision together with leverage decision as suggested by theories. Considering that some hedging benefits, such as 
tax benefit of debt, are related to leverage, hotels could benefit from coordinating these two decisions. This also 
opens interesting research opportunities in investigating the factors that contribute to this phenomenon.  
 
Second, in the hotel industry, the hedging benefits associated with higher debt capacity and the ability to 
realize growth opportunities might not be significant enough for hotels to engage in hedging when the level of 
financial distress is low. Third, hotels with a high level of financial distress reduce the overall extent of hedging as 
leverage and growth opportunities increase. Furthermore, hotels increase short positions when the level of financial 
distress is high. Since financially distressed hotels have lower levels of revenue, the short positions are not likely 
employed to hedge the long exposure arising from the revenue. This could be a hint that financially distressed hotels 
use short positions to increase the cash flow volatility.  
 
Finally, higher management ownership would results in less hedging. This may be a reflection that hotel firms 
generally have higher level of financial distress and act like firms under financial distress; hedge less. These unique 
hedging behaviors are the additional factors that board of directors could take into account when evaluating the 
corporate risk management program to enhance corporate governance and eventually shareholder value. 
The results are restrictive in several dimensions. The sample is small and limited to hotel firms. Due to certain 
unique characteristics such as a high level of fixed assets and leverage, hotels’ hedging decisions might respond 
differently to the determinants suggested by theories. Also, the relationship between hedging and leverage under 
different levels of financial distress are estimated using static data. It could be that the hedging and leverage 
decisions represented in the dataset are already equilibrium given the benefits and costs. Finally, the Z-score adopted 
is based on a sample of manufacturing firms and may not best represent the level of financial distress of service 
firms. 
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